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REPORTS OF CASES 
DETERMINED IN 
THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
(56 C.Id 11; It CaI.Rph-. 25. 3a P.Id 25) 
[L. A. No. 25637. In Bank. May 29, 1961.] 
SCANDINAVIAN AIRLINES SYSTEM, INC. (a Corpora-
tion), Respondent, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
et al., Appellants. 
[1] Aeronautics-Airports.-The actions of a city international 
airport in its capacity as a port of entry to the United States 
must be viewed as they may affect commerce with foreign 
nations. Such view poses federal questions even in the absence 
of Congressional enactment. 
[2] Taxation-Place for Taxation-Personal PropertJ'.-Although 
movable personalty is generally held to be taxable only at its 
owner's place of residence, it may attain a tax situs different 
from such place by reason of permanency of location or use 
within the taxing jurisdiction. 
[3] Id.-Place for Taxation-Personal PropertJ'.-The basis for a 
tax situs of movable personal property other than the owner's 
place of residence must be reasonable and cannot be supplied 
by arbitrary acts of the owner, taken for purposes of tax 
avoidance. 
[2] See Oal.J'v.2d, Taxation, § 116 et seq.; Am.J'v., Taxation, 
1448. 
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Aeronautics, § 5(1}; [2,3] Taxation, 
§88; [4] Taxation, §91; [5,8,9,14] Taxation, §§90, 94; [6,7,10, 
13,16] Taxation, § 90; [11] Taxation, §§ 91.5, 94; [12,20,23] Taxa-
tion, § 91.5; [15, 19] Aeronautics, § 1; [17] Taxation, §§ 91, 91.5; 
[18] Commerce, § 8; [21] Treaties, § 1; [22] Treaties, § 4; [24] 
State of California, § S. 
(11 ) 
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[4] Id.-Place for 'l'axation-Vessels.-Ocean-going vessels, ply-
ing international waters, engaged in either interstate or foreign 
trade, even when owned by residents or citizens of this COUD-
try,-may not be taxed by any jurisdiction other than that of 
their home port, and the jurisdiction of domicile may tax such 
instrumentalities on a full ad valorem basis. 
[6] Id.-Place for 'l'axation-Instrumentalities of Oommunication: 
l1Diformity.-The denial of taxing power to nondomiciliary 
states does not depend on the actual fact of taxation at the 
domicile, but is based on the proposition that instrumentalities 
of communication with other nations comprise a field which 
admits of but one uniform system of regulation, which by its 
very nature must be exclusively federal. 
[8] Id.-Place for 'l'axa.tion-Instrumentalities of Oommunication. 
-Because of the exclusively federal nature of the field of in-
strnmentalities of communication with other nations, it makes 
no di1ference that Congress has not acted in the field of taxation 
of such instrnmentalities. 
[7] IeL-Place for 'l'uation-Instrnmentalities of Oommunication. 
-Instrnmentalities of interstate commerce which do Dot leave 
the United States (such as railroad rolling stock and vessels 
plying inland waters only) may be taxed in each jurisdiction 
wherein they are engaged in commerce. 
[8] IeL-Place for'l'axation-Instrnmentalities of Oommunication: 
l1Diformity.-In order to avoid a burden on commerce, the 
various jurisdictions authorized to tax instrnmentalities of 
interstate commerce which do not leave the United States must 
eonftne themselves to a levy on an apportioned basis, related 
to the time or use within the jurisdiction, rather than to benefits 
conferred, in order that the total taxes so assessed shall not 
amount to more than one single ad valorem tax. 
[Da, Db] Id.-Place for 'l'axation-Instrnmentalities of Oommunica-
tion: l1Diformity.-The right of one jurisdiction to tax instru-
mentalities of interstate commerce which do not leave the 
United States on an apportioned basis precludes the right of 
the jurisdiction of domicile to tax on a full ad valorem basis. 
[10] Id.-Place for 'l'axation-Instrumentalities of Oommunication. 
-The furnishing of benefit and protection, standing alone, 
does not confer on any jurisdiction the power to tax an instru-
mentality of commerce unless the instrnmentality falls within 
the class of property which may be taxed according to settled 
principles. 
[4] Situs of vessels for tax purposes, note, 26 A.L.B.Sd 1376. 
See also Cal.Jur.2d, Taxation, § 125; Am.Jur., Taxation, § 912 
et seq. 
) 
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[11] Id.-Place for 'laxation-Airplanes: tJniformity.-Airplanes 
flying solely in interstate commerce, based in the United States 
or owned by domestic concerns, and which do not leave the 
jurisdictional limits of the United States, will be taxed under 
the same principles which apply to other instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce. 
[12a-12e] Id.-Place for 'laxation-Airplanes.-The "home-port" 
doctrine, under which no jurisdiction other than that of the 
true domicile may tax instrumentalities of communication en-
gaged in foreign commerce, applies to foreign owned and 
foreign based and registered aircraft flown exclusively in 
foreign commerce with but a single United States port. 
[13] Id.-Place for 'laxation-Instrumentalities of Communication. 
-Any instrumentality of commerce is subject to taxation in its 
true domicile, but this power to tax is subject to limitations as 
to the manner of taxation when a taxable situs has been ac-
quired in another jurisdiction. The Deed for such limitation 
arises from the necessity of protecting against double taxation. 
[14] Id.-Place for 'laxation-Instrumentalities of Communication: 
tJniformity.-Not every instrument of commerce may gain more 
than a single taxable situs. When such a vehicle becomes an 
instrument of communication with foreign nations, the ap-
portioned basis of taxation is unworkable because the courts 
of this country can exercise no control over the foreign taxing 
authorities; the matter then should become an exclusively 
federal one. 
[15] Aeronautics-Law Governing.-As the vessel which sails the 
seas is subject to admiralty law, airplanes flying international 
skies are subject to all manner of international aviation law. 
They are in no manner the equivalent of instrumentalities of 
commerce which travel exclusively between the various states 
of this country. 
[16] 'laxation --Place for 'laxation - Instrumentalities of Com-
munication.-Any instrumentality which engages in commerce 
between two or more sovereign nations must have but one 
taxable situs, and such situs must be the port where the instru-
mentality is in good faith domiciled. 
[17] Id.-Place for 'laxation-Vessels: Airplanes.-As a matter of 
principle it should be held that both seagoing vessels and air-
planes engaged solely in interstate commerce are subject to the 
apportionment theory of taxation, regardless of utilization of 
inland or international routes. But when they are instrumen-
talities of communication with foreign nations and enter the 
[11] Situs of airplanes for purposes of taxation, Dote, 153 
A.L.R. 264. 
J 
14 SOANDINAVIAN Am.L.INES SYSTElrI, INO. tI. [56 C.2d 
COUNTY OF Los .ANGELES 
territory of a given state for the sole purpose of utilizing a 
port thereof as a port of entry to the United States, there is 
no distinction between a ship or an airplane when both engage 
in commerce between nations; both are amenable to inter-
national law and agreement, each may be fully taxed in its 
home port in such manner as the laws of the domicile provide, 
and those laws are not subject to review by the courts of the 
nation in which the nondomiciliary port is located. 
[18] Commerce-Tua.tion.-While valuation may be used as a 
basis for taxing an instrument of commerce when the owner is 
a resident or when the instrumentality has otherwise acquired 
a taxable situs, the power so to tax is based on the right to tax 
the person on his financial investment. If the charge attempted 
to be imposed is one which, by the terms of the statute or 
ordinance imposing it, may become due from an instrumentality 
of foreign commerce without any services being rendered to it 
or without the enjoyment of special benefits and from the mere 
fact that it has arrived in a port of the state, it is a charge 
on tonnage and not collectible. 
[19] Aeronautics-Applicability of Admiralty Concepts.-Since the 
advent of the airplane there has developed a large body of 
international air law which, when substituted for admiralty 
concepts, provides equal reason for considering international 
air flights on the same basis as vessels sailing international 
waters. 
[20] Tua.tion-Place for Taxation-Airplanes-Effect of Federal 
Legislation and Regmations.-Though federal legislation and 
regulatory enactments relating to air traffic do not indicate an 
intent to enter or bar the states from entering the field of 
taxation of foreign owned and foreign based and registered 
aircraft flown exclusively in foreign commerce with but a 
single United States port, they do indicate the peculiarly 
federal nature of the entire field. 
[21] i'reaties-lfature.-Treaties represent executive action and, 
although approved by the Senate, are not the Congressional 
action contemplated by the commerce clause (U. S. Const., 
art. I, § 8, c1. S). 
[22] Id.-As Supreme Law.-Treaties are the supreme law of the 
land, binding on the courts of every state. (U. S. Const., 
art. VI, cl. 2.) 
[2Sa, ISb] Tua.tion - Place of Taxation - Airplanes - Effect of 
Treaty With Sweden.-The terms of the treaty respecting 
double taxation between the United States and Sweden (effec-
tive in 1940), 'which specifically bans property taxes on ships 
and air lines if such vehicle of commerce is not registered 
in the taxing nation, prevent the several states from imposing 
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any type of property tax on airplanes owned, based and 
registered in any foreign country unless the overall operations 
. of the owner bring such airplanes within the area of property 
to be taxed, as such is defined in that treaty. 
[24] State of California - Sovereignty. - The principles of state 
sovereignty apply to internal matters only. No state is sover-
eign in the eyes of a foreign nation; it cannot deal directly 
with a foreign nation by treaty or otherwise; this it must 
leave to the federal government. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Philbrick McCoy, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action by owner of foreign owned and registered aircraft 
to recover property taxes levied by both a city and county 
against airplanes flown exclusively in foreign commerce. Judg-
ment for plaintiff affirmed. 
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, and Alfred Charles 
De Flon, Deputy County Counsel, for Appellants. 
Musick, Peeler & Garrett, Elvon P. Musick, Roderick M. 
Hills, Richard D. Esbenshade and Kenneth E. Scott for Re-
spondent. 
Condon & Forsyth, Darling, Shattuck & Edmonds, Cyril 
H. Condon, Hugh W. Darling, Rodolphe J. A. de Seife, 
Graham, James & Rolph, Robert D. Mackenzie, Foley, James 
& Conran, Frank J. Foley, James J. Conran, Pillsbury, Madi-
son & Sutro, Turner H. McBaine, Noel Dyer, Chapman, 
Walsh & O'Connell, Joseph J. O'Connell, Jr., and Arthur 
K. Mason as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondent. 
PETERS, J.-Defendants, the county of Los Angeles and 
the city of Los Angeles, have appealed from a judgment 
requiring them to refund to the plaintiff certain personal 
property taxes which were levied against plaintiff's foreign 
owned and based aircraft flown exclusively in foreign com-
merce, and which utilized Los Angeles International Airport 
as their sole United States terminus. The United States 
Supreme Court, and the highest courts of the several states, 
have spoken with apparent finality regarding the right to 
tax and the method of taxation of ocean-going vessels engaged 
in both foreign and interstate commerce, and the courts have 
) 
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had occasion to determine similar questions involving aircraft 
engaged solely in interstate commerce (Northwest Airlines v. 
Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 [64 S.Ct. 950, 88 L.Ed. 1283, 153 
A.L.R. 245] ; Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Board 
of Equalization, 347 U.S. 590 [74 S.Ct. 757, 98 L.Ed. 967] ; 
Slick Airways, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 140 Cal.App.2d 
311 [295 P.2d 46]), and domestically owned and based air-
planes engaged in foreign commerce (Flying Tiger Line, Inc. 
v. County of Los Angeles, 51 Ca1.2d 314 [333 P.2d 323]). 
However, the precise problem presented here, wherein the air-
planes sought to be taxed locally are: (1) foreign owned, 
(2) foreign based and registered, and (3) flown solely in 
foreign commerce with but a single United States port, has 
not as yet, insofar as we have been advised, been passed on by 
the appellate courts. 
The facts are undisputed. Defendants' general demurrer 
to plaintiff's complaint was overruled, and the parties then 
stipulated that the material facts of the complaint be taken 
as true, that judgment be entered in favor of plaintiff, without 
necessity of further proof, and that defendants retain their 
right to appeal from such judgment. The following is a sum-
mary of the material allegations of the complaint: 
1. Plaintiff operates an air line, solely in foreign commerce, 
between Copenhagen, Denmark, and Los Angeles, California. 
All of its airplanes are owned, based and registered in one 
of three Scandinavian home ports. 1 The service referred to 
is rendered under a permit granted by the United States Civil 
Aeronautics Board. The planes stop en route in Canada, but 
touch the United States only at Los Angeles International 
Airport. 
2. During the period involved herein each of plaintiff's air-
planes averaged eight round-trip flights per year, and re-
mained at its Los Angeles terminus for less than 34 bours 
on each flight.2 
1For the purpose of this decision, plaintiff may be considered as the 
operat.or and owner of the mentioned airplanes. Actually, plaintiff is 
but the United States representative of a consortium of Danish Airlines, 
Swedish Airlines and Norwegian Airlines. The airplanes are individually 
owned by the respective members of the consortium, and are registered 
and based in Copenhagen, Stockholm and Oslo, respectively. For the 
purpose of their United States flights, the European terminus of each is 
Copenhagen. 
• Although the complaint is silent in regard to the use to which each 
airplane is put during the balance of the year, it may be assumed that 
by far the greater portion of such period is devoted either to maintenance 
) 
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3. None of the planes was physically present in Los Angeles 
(or in the United States) on the first Monday of March in the 
year for which taxes were levied. 
4. Defendant County of Los Angeles assessed each of the 
airplanes upon an "apportionment" basis, by means of a 
formula which was intended to determine that portion of 
the airplane's value measured by the period during which it 
was physically present in the county. Such formula added one 
hour "flying time" per trip, to the actual time spent on the 
ground in Los Angeles, and divided this figure into the total 
hours in the tax year. Based upon the assessment so calculated, 
defendant county levied a personal property tax on each of 
the airplanes on its own behalf, and upon behalf of the defend-
ant city. 
5. During the period for which defendants levied such tax, 
each of the airplanes was taxed, on an unapportioned basis, 
in its home port.' 
6. No foreign country levies a property tax on aircraft 
operated by any United States air line flying planes in foreign 
commerce.· 
7. The taxes levied by defendants constitute double taxation. 
8. Plaintiff's operations in making the Copenhagen-Los 
Angeles flights are subject to extensive regulation by the 
United States government (17 specific regulatory measures 
being alleged), and the United States is party to 19 separate, 
and specifically alleged, international treaties directly or in-
directly regulating and affecting such operations. 
9. Plaintiff paid the taxes demanded by defendants, under 
protest, and subsequently filed a claim for refund. 
The pleadings raise no issue regarding the propriety of the 
procedures taken on the claim for refund, and plaintiff does 
not question the formula by which defendants" apportioned" 
the tax. Hence the sole question involved is the validity of the 
tax. 
at its home port, to local transportation in its home country, or to inter· 
national transportation in which California is not involved. 
'Denmark, Sweden and Norway each taxed the "operations" of their 
respective nationals which opernted airplanes based in those countries, 
and Norway levied a property tax on the entire value of those pl8lles 
wbich were registered and based in Oslo. 
'Although not alleged in the complaint, it is argued by respondent, 
and not denied by appellants, that such reprisal taxation is now being 
threatened in several foreign eountries. 
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Because of their interest herein, most of the foreign airlines 
serving California have filed amici curiae briefs. 
Oontention of the Parties: 
In support of the judgment, plaintiff contends that: (1) the 
commerce clause of the United States Constitution prohibits 
the levy of this tax; (2) the tax is further prohibited by the 
due process clauses of both the federal and California Con-
stitutions; and, (3) there is no California statutory basis for 
this taxation. 
In support of its first contention-conflict with the com-
merce clause-plaintiff makes a three-fold argument. First, 
it claims that since there is no relevant distinction between 
aircraft flying the international skies and ocean-going vessels 
plying the high seas, the former should be subjected to the 
same "home-port" doctrine of taxation which the United 
States Supreme Court has applied to the latter. Second, 
plaintiff claims that taxation of aircraft based and owned in 
a foreign country is a matter of international concern within 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government (citing 
various federal regulatory acts and international treaties 
alleged to control). Its final argument in regard to the com-
merce clause is that "apportioned taxation" by California, 
together with un apportioned taxation by the government of 
the aircraft's home port, conflicts with the commerce clause 
in that it imposes double taxation, and places a far heavier 
burden upon such foreign aircraft than exists in the case of 
aircraft owned domestically. 
Plaintiff bases its second contention-repugnancy to the 
due process clauses-upon the claim that its airplanes have 
not acquired a taxable situs in California. 
Its third contention is predicated upon the argument that 
California's constitutional and general statutory provisions 
for taxation of the various forms of personal property do not 
contemplate the taxation of aircraft owned and based in 
foreign countries and engaged in foreign commerce, and that 
without specific legislative authority these defendants are 
without jurisdiction to levy this tax. 
Defendants contend that the commerce clause is inapplicable 
on several grounds. The first is that although that clause gives 
Congress the exclusive power to regulate commerce, such power 
is not denied to the several states until Congress has pre-
empted the field, which defendants claim has not been done. 
The second is that taxation of personal property does not 
) 
) 
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fall within that class of subjects which "admit only of one 
unjform system, or plan of regulation," which phrase has 
been applied as the test for exclusive legislation by the fed-
eral Congress. Defendants also claim that the decisions of 
the United States Supreme Court indicate a trend away from 
the "home-port" doctrine of taxation, and that if the question 
were to be submitted to that court today it would repudiate 
its former rule. As a final reply to the contention that the 
commerce clause prohibits the instant tax, defendants argue 
that instrumentalities of commerce, by their very nature, 
acquire more than one taxable situs, and that the undue 
burden on commerce which would otherwise be imposed is 
properly avoided by a system of apportioned taxation in each 
such situs; that the undue burden, if any, imposed on the 
instant aircraft is not the result of defendants' apportioned 
tax, but results from the fact that the domiciliary situs has 
levied taxes on the full value. 
R.eplying to plaintiff's contention that the due process 
clauses prohibit this tax, defendants contend that the sole test, 
insofar as due process is concerned, is whether the proposed 
tax has reasonable relation to the opportunities, benefits or 
protection conferred or accorded by the taxing state. Defend-
ants then point out that an apportioned tax, based solely upon 
the percentage of time which the property is actually within 
the County of Los Angeles, satisfies this test. 
In meeting plaintiff's third and last contention (lack of 
statutory basis for the tax) defendants argue that the Cali-
fornia Constitution fixes the liability of the property to taxa-
tion and the standard upon which it is based (i.e., in propor-
tion to its value),Gand that the only further requirement is 
that the Legislature provide the machinery by which to ascer-
tain such value (citing McHenry v. Downer, 116 Cal. 20 [47 
P. 779, 45 L.R.A. 737], and Crocker v. Scott, 149 Cal. 575 
[87 P. 102]). How, or in what manner, the Legislature has 
met this further requirement is not spelled out in defendants' 
briefs. 
f'he tI Home-Port" Doctrine: 
As stated above, plaintiff's main contention in support of 
the judgment is that the tax imposed by defendants violates 
"Article XIII, section i, provides: "All property in the State .•• 
not exempt under the lnws of tile Unitl'd States, shnll be taxed in propor-
tion to its value • • • ." 
) 
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the commerce clause of the United States Constitution. Its 
first point in support of this contention is that the United 
·States Supreme Court has clearly prohibited such state taxa-
tion in a line of decisions enunciating the "home-port" doc-
trine. By a series of opinions, covering a period of over a 
hundred years, that court has developed a body of law dealing 
with the power of local authorities to levy property taxes on 
instrumentalities of commerce which are transitory in char-
acter, and, in the course of engaging in trade, come within the 
territorial limits of one or more of the states of the Union. 
In each of the decisions embraced in that body of law, the 
United States Supreme Court has emphasized the importance 
of the true domicile, the port of registration, or home port, 
of the particular instrumentality sought to be taxed. It should 
be noted that in determining the validity or invalidity of a par-
ticular tax in light of this doctrine, the Supreme Court has 
Dot confined itself to a discussion of the commerce clause, but 
has also predicated its decision on the impact of the due 
process clause on such taxation.' But if a decision in this 
case is controlled by principles heretofore announced by the 
federal courts, it makes little difference whether those prin-
ciples were predicated upon one constitutional ground or 
another. The task with which we are faced was well stated 
in the Northwestern Airlines opinion (supra) as follows: "The 
answer involves the application of settled legal principles to 
the precise circumstances of this case." Thus, it is our duty 
to determine what "settled legal principles," if any, are ap-
plicable to the tax here under consideration. If that deter-
mination leads to the conclusion that the "home-port" doc-
trine is applicable herein it is our duty to so declare, not 
only because the United States Supreme Court has spoken with 
finality in a field which is peculiarly federal in nature, but 
because such principles have been definitely settled, and should 
·The earlier decisions dealing with the "home-port" doctrine appear 
to be based upon the commerce clause, in that they refer to an area of 
eorumerce subject to the "laws of the general government, to which 
belongs the regulation of commerce with foreign nations and between 
tbe states." (Bays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 17 How. (U.S.) 596" 
fl5 L.Ed. 254].) Subsequent decisions, as will be noted below, base the 
doctrine squarely upon the due proce88 elause by reason of lack of tuable 
situs in the taxing state. Still later, in NorlhtJJcst "firlines v. Minnesota, 
B'Upra, 322 U.S. 292, the court held the question to involve both the 
eommerce and the due process elauses, and failed to indicate clearly on 
wllich the decision was predicated. See State Ta.a:atiOfi of IntematiOfial 
"fir Tra1lllportatiOfl, 11 Stan.L.R. 518, at p. 520. 
) 
) 
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not be overruled except for most compelling reasons which do 
not here exist. It should also be noted that the basic princi-
ples which will determine the applicability or inapplicability 
of the" "home-port" doctrine have been enunciated by this 
court as well as by the United States Supreme Court. 
A reading of both the federal and state cases on the subject 
demonstrates that both courts have considered the subject 
to embrace a federal question without reference to any theory 
that it becomes such only when Congress pre-empts the field 
by enacting legislation. In fact, the basic decisions (both fed-
eral and state) have declared the "home-port" doctrine (and 
hence the invalidity of a proposed tax) although the federal 
legislature hao; never spoken on the subject. Inherent in the 
opinions, even when unstated, is a concept of the dual nature 
of a port of entry. Thus, Los Angeles International Airport 
is, on one hand, an integral portion of the city, county and 
state, subject to the sovereign powers thereof, and on the other 
hand is a port of entry to the United States. [1] In its 
latter capacity its actions must be viewed as they may affect 
commerce with foreign nations. Such view poses federal 
questions even in the absence of Congressional enactment. 
As early as 1851 taxing authorities in California attempted 
to levy property taxes on vehicles of commerce that touched 
temporarily in the various ports of this state. In 1854 the 
United States Supreme Court held, in Hays v. Pacific Mail 
Steamship Co., supra, 17 How. (U.S.) 596, that California 
could not tax an ocean going vessel, owned and registered 
in New York and operating in interstate commerce between 
that port and various ports in California and Oregon. The 
decision announced the rule that such a vessel might be taxed 
at its full value in its home port, and that the other states 
where it engaged in commerce were not entitled to levy a 
property tax of any nature, even though the vessel made 
regular stops therein for the purpose of discharging or taking 
on passengers and cargo, and remained on each trip for 
repairs and maintenance, and to await announcement of the 
next voyage. The decision was predicated in part upon the 
lack of a taxable situs in any but the home port, and held 
that such vessels enter the ports of other states t< independently 
of any control over them, except as it respects such ''/tunicipal 
and sanitary regu7ations of tile loca.l authorities as are flot 
inconsistc11t with the constitution and laws of the general gov-
) 
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e.rnment, to which belongs the regulation 01 commerce with 
foreign nations and between the states." (17 How. (U.S.) at 
. p. 598; emphasis added.) The opinion failed to mention any 
specific constitutional provision or federal law with which the 
attempted tax was in conflict. The reference to the lack of 
taxable situs gives credence to the claim that the doctrine was 
placed, in part at least, upon the due process clause. However, 
the statement to the effect that regulation of foreign and inter-
state commerce belongs to the federal government, indicates 
that the court also predicated the doctrine, in part, upon the 
commerce clause, even in the absence of any /ederallegislative 
enactment on the subject. This theory is bolstered by the fact 
that the opinion also stated that a vessel plying the high seas 
in interstate commerce is subject to admiralty law, even when 
lying in a domestic port other than that of her registry, and 
as such differs from vessels which remain wholly within na-
tional waters. Thus, the rule appears to have been further 
predicated upon a concept that a vessel which sails upon inter-
national waters must be subjected to different rules than one 
which never leaves national waters. This appears to be the 
only logical explanation for holding that an instrument of 
interstate commerce is immune from state control or taxation 
in the absence of any showing that the Congress has entered 
the field. 
Thus, the earliest statement of the "home-port" doctrine 
granted the state of domicile the power to tax in full, and 
denied to all other jurisdictions any power or right to tax 
except as might arise under the police power, when a vessel 
engaged in either interstate or foreign commerce used the 
open seas as a highway between ports. 
Since that date, the rule of the Hays case has been ex-
tended and modified, to fit differing situations, but insofar 
as we have been able to determine, it has never been over-
ruled. In fact, the court has specifically stated, as will be 
noted below, that certain of the limitations subsequently 
placed upon the rule were not to be deemed as altering the 
doctrine as applied to ships plying international waters. 
California thereafter accepted and applied the doctrine as 
announced in the Hays decision (City &; County of San Fran-
cisco v. Talbot, 63 Cal. 485,488-489; Olson v. Oity &; County of 
San Francisco, 148 Cal. 80, 82-83 [82 P. 850, 113 Am.St.Rep. 
191, 7 Ann.Cas. 443, 2 L.R.A. N.S. 197] ; Oalifornia etc. Co. 
v. City &; Oounty of San Francisco, 150 Cal. 145 [88P. 704] ; 
) 
') 
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SayZes v. County of Los Angeles, 59 Cal.App.2d 295 [138 
P.2d.768], and other cases). 
In 1870 the "home-port" doctrine was extended to vessels 
engaged in interstate commerce, and plying exclusively inland 
waters (St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 11 Wall. (U.S.) 423 
[20 L.Ed. 192]), but such extension was overruled in 1948. 
(See Oft v. Mississippi etc. Barge Line, 336 U.S. 169 [69 S.Ct. 
432, 93 L.Ed. 585].) 
At a very early date the United States Supreme Court 
held that the doctrine, denying to jurisdictions other than 
that of domicile the power to impose property taxes, was 
not dependent upon actual taxation in the home port (Morgan 
v. Parham, 16 Wall. (U.S.) 471,478 [21 L.Ed. 303]). By such 
decision, the United States Supreme Court inferentially held 
that the "home-port" doctrine was not based so much upon 
multiple taxation (which would clearly constitute a burden 
upon commerce in derogation of the commerce clause), as it 
was upon a concept of exclusive federal jurisdiction once an 
instrumentality of commerce left its home port for inter-
national waters. Viewed in light of the rule (established by 
the same court in Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Phila-
deZphia, 12 How. (U.S.) 299 [13 L.Ed. 996]) that the com-
merce clause does not prohibit the states from regulating 
commerce except in those fields wherein the federal congress 
has acted or those fields which admit only of one uniform 
system, it must be assumed that the authors of the "home-
port" doctrine held that taxation of a vessel which arrived in 
port via international waters falls within one of the two stated 
exceptions. Since it was not contended that Congress had acted 
in regard to such matters, it follows that taxation (except in 
the home port) of vessels sailing upon the high seas was within 
the latter classification. As the court stated in the Cooley 
opinion: "Whatever subjects of this power [to regulate com-
merce] are in their nature national, or admit only of one 
uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to 
be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by 
Congress." (12 How. (U.S.) at p. 319.) 
During the process of interpreting the "home-port" doc-
trine the courts carefully distinguished between the home port 
in its true sense (domicile of owner or permanent domicile of 
vessel) and fictitious home ports created solely by registry 
, (St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Co., supra, 11 Wall. (U.S.) 423; 
) 
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Old Dominion Steamship 00. v. Virginia, 198 U.S. 299 [25 S. 
Ct. 686,49 L.Ed. 1059]; Ayer & Lord Tie 00. v. Kentucky, 202 
U.S. 409 [26 S.Ct. 679, 50 L.Ed. 1082] ; Southern Pacific 00. v. 
Kentttcky, 222 U.S. 63, 67 [32 S.Ct. 13, 56 L.Ed. 96] ; Olson 
v. Oity & Oounty of San Francisco, supra, 148 Cal. 80; Sayles 
v. Oounty of Los Angeles, supra, 59 Cal.App.2d 295; Ships etc. 
Oorp.v. Oounty of San Diego, 93 Cal.App.2d 522 [209 P.2d 
143] ). By such limitation, the courts prevented the possibility 
of a misuse of the doctrine by owners who would otherwise 
create a fictitious home port in order to escape taxation. 
In 1890 the United States Supreme Court declared a dis-
tinction between vessels in interstate commerce and railroad 
rolling stock similarly engaged. In Pullman's Oar 00. v. 
Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 [11 S.Ct. 876, 35 L.Ed 613], it held 
that because rolling stock has no fixed situs, and travels over 
land, traversing and retraversing the various states, it must 
be treated differently for the purpose of taxation from ships 
which travel on international waterways, have a home port, 
and touch land only incidentally and temporarily. Quoting the 
earlier ease of Baltimore & Ohio R.R. 00. v. Maryland, 21 
Wall. (U.S.) 456 [22 L.Ed. 678], the court stated that inter-
state commerce on land is so dissimilar from interstate com-
merce by water that the two operations do not have the ~e 
aspects in reference to constitutional powers and duties of 
state and federal government, and that since vehicles of com-
merce by water are instrumentalities of communication with 
otker nations, the regulation of them is to be assumed by the 
national Legislature (141 U.S. at pp. 23-24)." 
The distinction thus announced between vessels sailing the 
high seas and railroad stock traveling by land ultimately led 
to the C< apportionment doctrine" of taxation as applied to the 
latter. Such doctrine, thereafter applied by both federal and 
California courts, authorizes property taxation in each juris-
diction into which a vehicle of interstate commerce enters 
(American Refrigerator Transit 00. v. Hall, 174 U.S. 70 [19 
S.Ct. 599, 43 L.Ed. 899] ; Union Refrigerator Transit 00. v. 
Lynch, 177 U.S. 149 [20 S.Ct. 631, 44 L.Ed. 708]; Union 
Transit 00. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 [26 S.Ct. 36, 50 L.Ed. 
150] ). Such cases, however, did not alter the original "home-
port" doctrine as applied to vessels, whether sailing the high 
• Again inferentially holding that the "home·port" doetrine is not 
predicated upon any present pre-emption of the field by the national 
Legislature. 
I 
I 
j 
) 
·May 1961] SCANDINAVIAN AIRLINES SYSTEM, IN'C.l1. 25 
COUNTY OF Los ANGELES 
(56 C.2d 11: 14 Cal.Rptr. 25. 363 P.2d 25] 
seas or exclusively inland waters. The doctrine remained 
applicable to all vessels which left the jurisdiction of a single 
state until 1948, when the United States Supreme Court had 
occasion to reexamine the rule. In the case of Ott v. Mississippi 
etc. Barge Line, supra, 336 U.S. 169, the court inferentially 
overruled the St. Louis decision, and held that there was no 
distinction, insofar as the due process and commerce clauses 
are concerned, between railroad cars and vessels when each 
move between the states by exclusively inland routes. In up-
holding an apportioned tax by Louisiana on tugs and barges 
operating out of another state on the Mississippi River, it 
distinguished the former cases (which adhered to the "home-
port " doctrine) on the ground that they involved ships sailing 
the high seas. As to those cases which had applied the "home-
port" doctrine of taxation to vessels plying only inland waters 
(presumably the St. Louis case) the court stated that for one 
reason or another the apportionment method of taxation had 
not been considered. Thus, the St. Louis case was overruled 
by implication. The decision would have been more precise 
had the court expressly overruled the St. Louis decision on 
the ground, only implied in the decision, that further analysis 
indicated that the very basis of the "home-port" doctrine 
(i.e., exclusive federal concern in regard to instrumentalities 
of communication with other nations) does not exist when the 
instrumentality does not leave the national boundaries. Of 
utmost importance, however, is the language of the Ott opinion 
(pp. 173-174) wherein the court said, "We do not reach the 
question of taxability of ocean carriage but confine our 
decision to transportation on inland waters." Thus, the 
limitation placed upon the "home-port" doctrine by the Ott 
decision does not rest upon whether the commerce is interstate 
or foreign, but upon whether the instrumentality stayed 
within the continental limits of the United States or travelled 
in international waters. Probably the court in making this 
distinction had in mind the reasoning, originally expressed 
in the Hays case, that when a vessel sails the international 
seas it becomes subjected to the rules of admiralty law, even 
while at rest in a domestic port. In other words, the court held 
(without specifically stating) that an instrumentality of com-
merce which leaves the nation's shores becomes so peculiarly 
imbued with international characteristics that it would be 
unwise to allow any state but that of domicile to exercise 
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sovereignty beyond that necessary under ordinary police 
powers.8 
When the apportioned method of taxation was originally 
adopted (first as applicable to railroad rolling stock, and 
subsequently to ships operating exclusively on inland waters) 
the taxation was held to be valid if levied under any formula 
which was reasonably related to the use of the property in 
the taxing state, or to the benefits or protection conferred on 
the property by that state. But in Souther"!, Pacific 00. v. 
Kentucky, supra, 222 U.S. 63, the court appeared to repudiate 
the doctrine of measuring the legality of the tax by the benefits 
or protection received. Because the case involved ocean-going 
vessels, subject to the "home-port" doctrine, it cannot be said 
to be determinative of any rule or formula for taxing those 
instrumentalities which are subject to apportioned levies. Al-
though we have found no case which requires the use of any 
specific formula, it appears that any method which a state 
uses to determine an otherwise legal apportioned tax must 
bear such relationship to time or use within the taxing state 
that the sum total of all apportioned taxes so levied by all 
states will not exceed one full ad valorem assessment. This 
conclusion is further strengthened by the ultimate announce-
ment by the Supreme Court (predicated on due process) that: 
"The rule which permits taxation by two or more states on 
an apportioned basis precludes taxation of all of the property 
by the state of domicile."· (Standard Oil 00. v. Peck (1952), 
342 U.S. 382, 384 [72 8. Ct. 309, 96 L.Ed. 427, 26 A.L.R.2d 
1371] .) 
It was inevitable that the issue of full taxation at the home 
port versus apportioned taxation at each port of call would 
arise in regard to air transportation. Certain phases of that 
issue have been presented to both the United States Supreme 
Court and to the various appellate courts of this state; but 
insofar as we have been able to determine, the precise question 
involved herein has not been heretofore before any court. 
The first United States Supreme Court case to consider the 
subject was Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota (1944), supra, 
322 U.S. 292. That case involved a :Beet of airplanes owned 
"Although it might have bcen more logical to have stated a distinction 
between interstate and foreign commerce it serves no real purpose to 
speculate on what the court might do if presented with the same problem 
today. Since we are here dealing with instrumentalities of foreign com· 
merce, travelling international skies, tllC distinction, if any, between the 
two bases for the doctrine is moot herein. 
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and operated by a Minnesota corporation, registered with a 
city of that state as their home port, utilizing that city as 
their rest and overhaul base, and operating therefrom entirely 
in interstate commerce. The court held that a Minnesota 
property tax levied upon the entire fleet on a full ad valorem 
basis did not violate either the commerce clause or the due 
process clause. Even though the planes were known to be en-
gaged in commerce in several other states (which might pre-
sumably tax them on an apportioned basis) the majority 
opinion held that taxability by such other states was not before 
the court. Thus, although the Northwest case authorized the 
full ad valorem tax in the state of domicile, it cannot be said 
to have applied the "home-port" doctrine to interstate air-
craft. Neither can it be taken for authority that apportioned 
taxes may be levied on such instrumentalities in each state. 
The apparent inconsistency of the language (inferring that 
both full ad valorem tax and apportioned tax might be possible 
under some circumstances) may be explained by the fact that 
the case preceded, by eight years, the Standard Oil case which 
put an end to such possibility. At least, such was the basis on 
which the court later explained the decision. (See Braniff 
Airways case, 347 U.S. 590, infra.) A more substantive ques-
tion arises from the fact that the Northwest decision did not 
give consideration to those cases wherein it. had previously 
held that instrumentalities of interstate commerce which do 
not leave the continental limits of the United States will be 
taxed on an apportioned basis in each state visited (Ott v. 
Mississippi etc. Barge Line, supra)." Analyzed in light of 
subsequent decisions, the Northwest case stands only for the 
proposition that domestic airplanes, flying exclusively in inter-
state commerce, and not leaving the continental limits of the 
United States, may be taxed at their home port on a full ad 
valorem basis if the parties do not urge the possibility of taxa-
tion elsewhere. It cannot be held to be a final determination 
-The autllOrization of a full ad valorem tax in the jurisdiction of domi· 
cile follows the original "home·port" doctrine as the same stood l)efore 
it was modified to exclude vehicles of interstate commerce which do not 
lea'\"e inland routes. The various inconsistencies inherent in the decision 
are not surprising wIlen it is noted that the court was unable to muster 
a majority to a single opinion, and that the decision consisted of a 
majority opinion by three justices, concurred in by two separate opinions 
of single justices, together with a dissenting opinion of four (making 
four separate and distinct opinions). Only the dissenting opinion dis· 
cussed the relation between taxation of ocean·going vessels and oth('r 
interstate vehicles as applied to airplanes. 
) 
28 SCANDINAVIAN AmLINES SYSTEM, INC. ". [56 C.2d 
COUNTY OF Los ANGELES 
of whether the full ad valorem tax or an apportioned tax is 
proper when aU the facts are known; and it is in no manner 
a determination of the basis for taxation of airplanes engaged 
in either interstate or foreign commerce and which fly outside 
the limits of the country. It is certainly not authority of any 
kind regarding foreign owned and based airplanes flying 
exclusively in foreign commerce. 
Taxation of airplanes was next presented ten years later 
in Braniff Airways v. Nebraska State Board of Equalization 
(1954), supra, 347 U.S. 590. In that decision the court author-
ized an apportioned tax by Nebraska on plaintiff's airplanes 
which were domiciled elsewhere, but which were engaged in 
interstate commerce in Nebraska. The case did not involve 
foreign commerce, and the planes did not leave continental 
United States. The court predicated the decision on taxable 
situs in Nebraska (due process) and held that since there 
was no demonstrable burden on interstate commerce, the com-
merce clause was no bar. In order to set at rest the incon-
sistencies of the Northwest decision, the court said, at p. 602: 
"When Standard Oil Co. v. Peek •.. was here, the Court 
interpreted the Northwest Airlines case to permit states other 
than those of the corporate domicile to tax boats in interstate 
commerce on the apportionment basis in accordance with their 
use in the taxing state. We adhere to that interpretation. "10 
The Northwest and Braniff cases (taken together with the 
intervening Standard Oil decision) therefore. stand only for 
the proposition that airplanes, flying solely in interstate com-
merce, and not crossing international boundaries, are to be 
treated (for the purpose of taxation) in the same manner as 
vessels engaged in similar commerce via exclusively inland 
waters. The language and rationale of the decisions create 
the inference that, should the United States Supreme Court be 
presented with a situation involving airplanes engaged in 
foreign commerce, or planes engaged in interstate commerce 
via international routes,l1 it would apply the same doctrines 
it has consistently applied to ocean-going vessels similarly en-
gaged. 
lOPerhaps it 'Would have been clearer had the court frankly admitted 
t.lmt the apportioned doctrine of taxation was not urged by the parties 
in the 'Northwest CRse, and hence the (,Ollrt had failed to consider its 
impact upon their decision therein. 
11 As between Alaska and other states of the union, 'With stops in 
Canada; or 8S between Hawaii and the mainland. 
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Two years subsequent to the Braniff decision the question 
of taxation of airplanes was presented in California, in Slick 
Airways v. County of Los Angeles, supt'a, 140 Cal.App.2d 
·311.12 In that case the parties conceded that Los Angeles 
County was entitled to tax, on an apportioned basis, a fleet of 
airplanes owned by a Delaware corporation and operated in 
interstate commerce between airports in various states, includ-
ing Los Angeles. The only issue was whether Los Angeles 
was entitled to tax on a full ad valorem basis a single airplane 
which plainti1f purchased in that county and which it kept 
therein for the purpose of conducting "shakedown" flights 
prior to adding it to the fleet. The court held that such facts 
did not give the airplane such permanent situs in Los Angeles 
as would preclude taxation on an apportioned basis elsewhere, 
and that the defendant county was therefore without the power 
to levy more than an apportioned tax, From the point of view 
of its place in this review of the growth of the doctrines govern-
ing taxation of instruments of commerce, the case is important 
only in that it is the first California decision in which there 
was an opportunity to determine the status of airplanes. The 
opinion followed the lead of the United States Supreme Court 
by SUbjecting the airplane in question to the same doctrines 
which were applicable to ships similarly engaged. The decision 
does not purport to deal with taxation of airplanes engaged in 
flights outside of continental United States. 
In 1958 this court decided Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. County 
of Los Angeles, supra, 51 Ca1.2d 314. Plaintiff, a Delaware 
corporation with its principal place of business in Los Angeles, 
operated airplanes in interstate commerce, as to which there 
was no issue,l8 It also owned five airplanes which it operated 
under the control of the United States military authorities 
on the Pacific airlift, in support of the war in Korea. In a 
four to three decision arrived at by a majority opinion of 
three, one other justice concurring in the result, the court 
held that a full ad valorem tax on such planes was improper, 
and plaintiff was granted the only relief which it sought, i.e., 
refund of the difference between the tax paid on the full ad 
valorem basis and a tax calculated on an apportioned basis. 
The dissenting opinion expressed the view that since it was 
UHearing by the Supreme Court was not requested. 
"1'11e interstate plalles were taxed 011 an apportioned basis, and were 
not involved in the action before the court. 
1 
) 
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not shown that the property was subject to taxation elsewhere, 
it should be subjected to a full ad valorem tax in California. If 
.None of the three opinions discussed the impact of the "home-
port" doctrine as it might be applicable to airplanes flying 
international skies. The authorities relied upon by the majority 
(Northwest Airlines, Ott v. Mississippi etc. Barge Line, Stom.d-
ard Oil Co. v. Peck, Braniff Airways, and Slick Airways, all 
s-upra) were all cases involving instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce which did not leave the continental limits of United 
States. By placing reliance on these decisions, the majority 
seemed to have been of the view that the Flying Tiger air-
planes were to be treated as if they were engaged in interstate 
commerce. The case cannot be considered authority for the 
proposition that airplanes flying only in foreign commerce will 
be taxed on either the "home-port" or the apportioned basis. 
From the foregoing summary of United States and Cali-
fornia decisions dealing with the "home-port" versus appor-
tioned doctrines of taxation of instrumentalities of commerce, 
certain conclusions may be drawn. These are the "settled 
principles" which determine the validity or invalidity of the 
instant tax, and may be stated as follows: 
[2] 1. Although movable personalty is generally held to 
be taxable only at its owner's place of residence, it may attain 
a tax situs different from such place by reason of permanency 
of location or use within the taxing jurisdiction; 
[3] 2. The basis for such alternative tax situs must be a 
reasonable one, and cannot be supplied by arbitrary acts of 
the owner, taken for purposes of tax avoidance; 
[ 4] 3. Ocean-going vessels, plying international waters, 
engaged in either interstate or foreign trade, even when owned 
by residents or citizens of this country, may not be taxed by 
any jurisdiction other than that of their home port, as such 
is defined above; and thc jurisdiction of domicile may tax 
such instrumentalities on a full ad valorem basis; 
[5] 4. The denial of taxing power to the nondomiciliary 
states does not depend upon the actual fact of taxation at the 
domicile, but is based upon the proposition that instrumen-
talities of communication with other nations comprise a 
"Thc dissent acknowledged that multiple taxation would be unconsti-
tutional, as II burden in violation 0:1' the commeree clau8c, but predicated 
its argumcnt on tIlE' lack 0:1' e\"'iilence that the planes mig-lit be taxed else· 
where; thus avoiding conflict with the establisllcd rule that power to tax 
I!lsewhere, rather than actual taxation, is controlling. 
) 
May 1961] SCANDINAVIAN AIRLINES SYSTEM, IN'c. fl. 31 
COUNTY OF Los ANGELES 
(56 C.2d 11; 14 Cal.Rptr. IS. 163 P.14 IS] 
field which admits of but one uniform system of regulation, 
which by its very nature must be exclusively federal; 
, [6], 5. Because of the exclusively federal nature of the 
field, it makes no difference that the Congress has not acted 
in the field of taxation of such instrumentalities; 
[7] 6. Because the proposition stated as (4), above, does 
not apply to them, instrumentalities of interstate commerce 
which do not leave United States (such as railroad rolling 
stock and vessels plying inland waters, only) may be taxed in 
each jurisdiction wherein they are engaged in commerce; 
[8] 7. In order to avoid a burden on commerce, the vari-
ous jurisdictions authorized to tax under the last stated prin-
ciple must confine themselves to a levy on an apportioned 
basis, related to the time or use within the jurisdiction, rather 
than to the benefits conferred, in order that the total taxes so 
assessed shall not amount to more than one single ad valorem 
tax;1G 
[9a] 8. It follows that the right of one such jurisdiction 
to tax on an apportioned basis precludes the right of the juris-
diction of domicile to tax on a full ad valorem basis ;111 
[10] 9. Since such practice would do violence to the 
principles stated above, the furnishing of benefit and pro-
tection, standing alone, does not confer on any jurisdiction 
the power to tax an instrumentality of commerce unless the 
instrumentality falls within the class of property which may 
be taxed according to the stated principles; 
[ 11 ] 10. Airplanes flying solely in interstate commerce, 
and based in the United States, or owned by domestic con-
cerns, and which do not leave the jurisdictional limits of the 
United States, will be taxed under the same principles which 
apply to other instrumentalities of interstate commerce. 
Neither state nor federal courts have as yet been called 
upon to determine the application of these principles to do-
mestically owned and based airplanes flying in foreign com-
merce, other than in the Flying Tiger case, which, for the 
reasons already discussed, is not here controlling. Nor has 
there been any occasion (prior to the instant case) to deter-
mine the applicability of such principles to foreign owned 
; uObvious}y, thB rule can only be enforced within the United States, 
where the Suprjlme Court may act as arbiter between the leVeral juris· 
dictions. 
, aeSee footnote 15, "'Fa. 
) 
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and based airplanes operating solely in foreign commerce and 
touching only one port in the United States . 
. [1Ia] It could be held that the instant case is controlled 
by the "home-port" doctrine which has been uniformly ap-
plied by both state and federal courts for over a hundred 
years; that under that doctrine no jurisdiction, other than 
that of the true domicile, may tax instrumentalities of com-
munication engaged in foreign commerce; and that airplanes, 
:Hying the international skies, do not differ substantially from 
vessels sailing the international seas. If these conclusions are 
Bound, then, under the doctrine of sta.re decisis, the judgment 
of the trial court should be affirmed. 
But, because the precise question here involved has not 
yet been passed upon by the federal courts, we think we should 
also decide the question on principle. The question is, should 
the "home~port" doctrine, as a matter of principle, be ap-
plied to the facts of the instant case' 
We think that that doctrine should be so applied. The 
prior cases, while they have not decided the precise point here 
involved, have laid down a very definite pattern of con-
stitutional law which we think is sound and controlling. 
[13] It certainly has been established that any instrumen-
tality of commerce is subject to taxation in its true domicile. 
But this power to tax is subject to limitations as to the manner 
of taxation when a taxable situs has been acquired in another 
jurisdiction. The need for such limitation arises from the 
necessity of protecting against double taxation. [Db] Thus 
the instrumentality which, by reason of being engaged in in-
terstate commerce, gains taxable situs in two or more states, 
is subjected to taxation on an apportioned basis only; and 
that fact limits the right of the domicile to impose a full ad 
valorem tax. [14:] But, by reason of other considerations, 
not every instrumentality of commerce may gain more than 
a single taxable situs. When such a vehicle becomes an in-
strument of communication with foreign nations it is apparent 
that the apportioned basis of taxation is unworkable because 
the courts of this country can exercise no control over the 
foreign taxing authorities. The matter then should become 
an exclusively federal one. To this extent we agree partially 
with the appellants herein who state in their briefs on file 
that: "State taxation of the planes of foreign . air carriers 
involves international political and economic problems which 
the courts are incapable of satisfactorily resolving. Decision 
) 
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of whether the states should have the power to tax planes of 
foreign air carriers engaged in foreign commerce should be 
left exclusively with the executive and legislative branches 
of the· federal government." Of course, appellants' quoted 
statement was made in support of the argument that we are 
unable to act in contravention of the tax. We cannot agree 
with that conclusion. [12b] We do, however, find in their 
statement solid ground on which to hold that the exclusively 
federal nature of the :field requires us to apply the "home-
port" doctrine, and thus to hold that no jurisdiction save 
that of domicile has any authority to levy a personal property 
tax on these airplanes. There is no logical basis for holding 
that these airplanes differ from other instrumentalities of 
communication with foreign nations, so as to avoid that doc-
trine. [15] As the vessel which sails the seas is subject to 
admiralty law, airplanes flying international skies are subject 
to all manner of international aviation law. They are in no 
manner the equivalent of instrumentalities of commerce which 
travel exclusively between the various states of this country. IT 
[18] In our opinion, the basic reasoning behind the controll-
ing principles is that any instrumentality which engages in 
commerce between two or more sovereign nations must have 
but one taxable situs. Common sense requires that such situs be 
the port where the instrumentality is in good faith domiciled. 
It is true that this conclusion does not explain the inclu-
sion in the "home-port" doctrine of vessels plying interna-
tional waters but engaged solely in interstate commerce. Such 
vessels were originally included in the doctrine on the ground 
that they never gained taxable situs in the port which they 
temporarily visited. The view expressed in this opinion would 
exclude them from the doctrine because, nQt being instru-
ments of communication with a foreign country, they do not 
"Such instrumentalities, be they ferry boats, tugs, motor vehicles or 
railroad rolling stock, remain for unlimited periods of time within the 
tmng .tate, utilizing the wharves, port facilities, rails, roads, streets 
and other facilities of the state, moving from point to point therein, 
loading and unloading at various points, and perliaps engaging in intra· 
state activities therein. They have therefore been considered to have 
gained a taxable situs in such state far beyond that which might be 
applicable to that of a ship or airplane which enters the state only at a 
port of entry to the United States, and which remains in such port until 
it again leaves the country. There appears to be no reason why the 
former should not be taxed in proportion to its semi-permanent sojourn 
in the state and its use of divergent facilities unconnected with those at 
the port of entry. 
18 c.J4-I 
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pose an exclusively federal question. This distinction, per-
haps, can be explained on historical grounds. The faet that 
the courts have not announced a change in the "home-port" 
doctrine to the extent of excluding such vessels may be at-
tributed to the fact that no case involving such an instru-
mentality of commerce has been brought before them in 
recent times. [17] As a matter of principle it should be 
held that both seagoing vessels and airplanes engaged solely 
in interstate commerce are subject to the apportionment 
theory of taxation, regardless of utilization of inland or inter-
national routes. But even if it were so held, such holding 
would not affect the status of instrumentalities engaged in 
commerce with foreign nations. Whether they be sailing ves-
sels, steamships or airplanes, they are in a different category. 
In our opinion, being instrumentalities of communication 
with foreign nations, they remain subject to the "home-port" 
doctrine and are not taxable anywhere but in the jurisdiction 
of their domicile. They enter the territory of a given state 
for the sole purpose of utilizing a port thereof as a port of 
entry to the United States. In this respect there is no dis-
tinction between a ship or an airplane when both engage in 
commerce between nations. Both are amenable to interna-
tional law and agreement. Each may be fully taxed in its 
home port in such manner as the laws of the domicile provide, 
and those laws are not subject to review by the courts of the 
nation in which the non domiciliary port is located. Other-
wise double taxation would inevitably result. In the language 
of the Hays case, each must be considered to enter the non-
domiciliary port "independently of any control over them, 
except as it respects such municipal and sanitary regulations 
of the local authorities as are not inconsistent with the con· 
stitution and laws of the general government to which belongs 
the regulation of commerce . . . ." 
A somewhat analogous situation has been discussed in those 
cases involving the second and third clauses of section 10 of 
article I of the United States Constitution.18 In reviewing 
attempts by various ports of entry to levy charges against 
ships entering their harbors, the federal courts have held such 
'"The pertinent language provides: 
" [cl. 2] No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any 
Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely 
necessary for executing its inspection laws .••. 
"[cI. 3] No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any 
Duty of ToJJ.Daire • • • ." 
) 
I 
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charges to be valid when either the ship or its owner was 
domiciled within the taxing authority (The North Cape (N.D. 
Ill.), 18 F.Cas. 342), or when the charge was imposed for the 
use of wharves or other facilities, as distinct from a general 
tax (Vicksburg v. Tobin, 100 U.S. 430, 433 [25 L.Ed. 690] ; 
Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama, 296 U.S. 261 [56 S.Ct. 194, 
80 L.Ed. 215] ). But the federal courts have held such charges 
to be invalid when they constituted an attempt to levy a 
property tax on instrumentalities of commerce not domiciled 
therein. (See Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (U.S.) 1, 89 [6 
L.Ed. 23] ; Packet etc. CO. Y. Keokuk, 95 U.S. 80 [24 L.Ed. 
377] ; Peete v. Morgan, 19 Wall. (U.S.) 581 [22 L.Ed. 201]; 
State Tonnage Tax Cases, 12 Wan. (U.S.) 204 [20 L.Ed. 370].) 
The rationale of those cases appears to be that: a duty of ton-
nage imposed upon an instrumentality of commerce (i.e., the 
carrier as distinct from the cargo) which is not owned or domi-
ciled within the state, and which duty is not a charge for a 
specific service rendered, amounts to a duty levied as a condi-
tion to being allowed to enter or leave port; such a duty 
represents an interference with commerce; and, no state is at 
liberty to interfere with foreign commerce. The fact that the 
present case involves an ad valorem tax rather than a tax 
based upon tonnage of vessel does not alter the underlying 
principles. [18] While valuation may be used as a basis 
for taxing an instrumentality of commerce when the owner 
is a resident, or when the instrumentality has otherwise 
acquired a taxable situs, the power to so tax is based upon the 
right to tax the person upon his financial investment (Wheel-
ing etc. Transportation Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U.S. 273, 279 [25 
L.Ed. 412]). If the charge attempted to be imposed is one 
which, by the terms of the statute or ordinance imposing it, 
may become due from an instrumentality of foreign commerce 
without any services being rendered to it, or without the 
enjoyment of special benefits, and from the mere fact that it 
has arrived in a port of the state, it is a charge on tonnage, 
and therefore not collectible (48 Am.Jur., § 651, p. 454, citing 
various federal cases as well as this court's opinion in Oakland 
v. E. K. Wood Lumber Co., 211 Cal. 16 [292 P. 1076, 80 A.L.R. 
379]). There is no logical reason why the stated principles 
should apply only if the proposed tax is based upon the gross 
tonnage of a vcssel, and be inapplicable if the same tax is 
based upon tIle vessel's value. Those principles are equally 
applicable as a basis for applying the "home-port" doctrine 
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to airplanes :flying exclusively in foreign commerce and utiliz-
ing a port of this state as a port of entry to the United States. 
In attacking the "home-port" doctrine as here applied, 
defendants urge several arguments. They contend that the 
real basis for distinguishing between vessels sailing the high 
seas and those plying only inland waters is not a commerce 
concept at all and that it springs solely from the common law 
concepts of admiralty which are not necessarily applicable to 
airplanes. Such an argument overlooks the fact that the 
vessels between which such distinction was made were all 
engaged in interstate commerce, and that here we are dealing 
with instrumentalities of foreign commerce. [19] Another 
answer to the argument is that since the advent of the airplane 
there has developed an equally large body of international 
air law, which, when substituted for the admiralty concepts, 
provides equal reason for considering international air :flights 
on the same basis as vessels sailing international waters. 
Defendants also urge the apparent trend of the United 
States Supreme Court in declaring more and more exceptions 
to the application of the rule as first announced in the Hays 
decision. This, they argue, indicates a definite attitude in 
opposition to the "home-port" doctrine. They claim that if 
the higher court were given the opportunity today, it would 
repudiate the entire rule as contrary to modern theories of 
taxation. One answer to this proposition comes from the 
United States Supreme Court itself. As mentioned above, in 
our analysis of the growth of the doctrine, in 1948 that court 
excluded vessels utilizing only inland waters from the applica-
tion of the "home-port" rule (Ott v. Mississippi etc. Barge 
Line, supra, 336 U.S. 169). In so doing, it expressly refrained 
from making the decision applicable to interstate vessels 
traversing the open seas. Why, then, should we anticipate a 
change in regard to instrumentalities of foreign commerce, as 
to which there is greater cause to apply the doctrine' If, as 
is argued, that court is about to reverse itself, it is not for us 
to anticipate such action. At this point we would not consider 
a request to hold that a steamship plying the high seas in 
foreign commerce is to be excluded from application of the 
"home-port" doctrine. We should not be expected to do so 
in regard to an airplane similarly engaged, when the con-
trolling principles (and reasoning behind them) are equally 
applicable. [12c] vIr e therefore hold the "home-port" doc-
trine to be applicable herein, and that the power to tax air-
) 
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planes engaged solely in commerce with foreign nations is 
vested exclusively in the place of true domicile, which juris-
diction may impose a tax on the full value, to the exclusion of 
property taxation elsewhere, whether upon an apportioned 
basis or otherwise. 
Is the tax barred by federal regulation or international treaty' 
This conclusion is sufficient to dispose of the case. But be-
cause we have elected to decide this case on principle as well 
as on the doctrine of stare decisis there are other factors 
that should be considered. One is the impact, if any, of 
federal regulation and treaty on defendants' power to impose 
the instant tax. Admittedly, under the commerce clause of 
the United States Constitution, the Congress is given the 
power to legislate as to interstate and foreign commerce to the 
exclusion of the several states. If it has done so the tax here 
involved must be held to be invalid. [20] Plaintift' does not 
cite us to any federal legislation which, by its nature, specifi-
cally excludes state taxation. The regulatory enactments 
which it pleads indicate that Congress has pre-empted the 
field of regulating air traffic (both foreign and interstate) to 
the extent of protecting public safety, welfare, convenience 
and necessity. But none of the regulatory enactments indicate 
an intent to enter, or to bar the states from entering, the field 
of taxation. Insofar as they should be considered herein, the 
federal regulations which have been called to our attention 
do not bar the tax imposed by defendants. They do, however, 
indicate the peculiarly federal nature of the entire field. 
[21] The international treaties upon which plaintiff 
relies pose a more difficult problem. They represent executive 
action, and although approved by the Senate (U.S. Const., 
art. II, § 2, cl. 2) are not the Congressional action contem-
plated by the commerce clause (art. I, § 8, cl. 3). But they are 
equally binding on the states. [22] Treaties are the su-
preme law of the land, binding upon the courts of every 
state (art. VI, cl. 2). If the tax here under review is repug-
nant to the terms of any such treaty, the tax must be declared 
invalid. 
[23a] Of the several treaties alleged in the complaint as 
regulating plaintiff's operations, three are of particular in-
terest. These are: (1) •• Convention and protocol between the 
United States of America and Sweden respecting double 
taxation," dated March 23, 1939, ratified August 2, 1939, 
") 
) 
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proclaimed December 12, 1939, and effective January 1, 1940 
(54 Stat. 1759, T.S. No. 958); (2) "Convention between the 
United States of America and Denmark respecting double 
ta:x~tion .... " dated May 6, 1948, and effective December 1, 
1948 (62 Stat. 1730, T.LA.S. No. 1854) ; and (3) "Convention 
between the United States of America and Norway for the 
avoidance of double taxation ... " dated June 13, 1949 (2 
U.S.T. [1951] pt. 2, p. 2323, T.I.A.S. No. 2357, and 2 U.S.T. 
[1951] pt. 2, p 2353, T.I.A.S. No. 2358). These treaties, by 
their language, are aimed at the avoidance of duplication of 
taxation by the signatory powers, or by political subdivisions 
thereof, in cases where nationals of one signatory power are 
engaged in business in the territorial limits of the other power. 
It is also clear that they are intended to cover shipping and 
air traffic within the protected types of business ventures. 
The extent to which they go, particularly with reference to 
the types of taxation against which protection is afforded, is 
not clear. If reference is made to the titles, only the treaties 
with Denmark and Norway would appear to be limited to 
taxes on income, estates and inheritances. Nothing in the 
title of the treaty with Sweden limits the type of taxes which 
is intended to be covered. The preamble of the latter states 
that the parties are "desirous of avoiding double taxation and 
of establishing rules of reciprocal administrative assistance in 
the case of income and otlter taxes .... " (Emphasis added.) 
Article I of that treaty sets forth a list of taxes (by general 
type rather than specific name) as the "taxes referred to in 
this Convention." In the case of the United States the list 
includes federal income tax (including surtax and excess 
profits tax) and federal capital stock tax. In the case of 
Sweden income and property taxes are mentioned. As to both 
powers, the list includes "any other or additional taxes im-
posed by either . . . upon substantially the same bases as 
the taxes enumerated herein." If we were to read no further 
it might be assumed that the treaty does not apply to property 
taxes imposed by the several states of this nation. However, 
article XIII, without referring to the statements made in the 
preamble or in article I, provides that in regard to certain 
types of property (specifically including air tramport under-
takings) •• taxes on property or increment of property . . . 
may be levied only in that contracting State which is entitled 
under the preceding Articles to tax the income from such 
property." Referring to such preceding articles, it is clear 
) 
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that neither nation may tax the profits of enterprises of the 
citizens of the other except as such profits are allocable to a 
permanent establishment in the taxing nation (art. II). Even 
more specific is the provision that income of an enterprise 
derived from the operation of a ship or aircraft shall be tax-
able only in the nation in which such ship or aircraft is regis-
tered (art. IV). Taking the treaty as a whole, we find that 
the United States and Sweden have agreed that each will re-
frain from taxing either the income of or the property belong-
ing to the nationals of the other country except insofar as such 
income is allocable to or the property is a portion of a perma-
nent establishment in the taxing nation. Insofar as ships and 
air lines are concerned they have agreed to levy neither income 
nor property tax even where there is a permanent establish-
ment, if such vehicle of commerce is not registered in the tax-
ing nation. Since plaintiff maintains no permanent establish-
ment in the United States, and one-third of its airplanes are 
registered and based in Norway, Sweden and Denmark, respec-
tively, it follows that the instant tax, at least insofar as it is 
applied to the one-third of the planes registered in that coun-
try, is barred by the provisions of the treaty with Sweden . 
. Turning now to the treaties with Norway and Denmark, we 
find no such specific ban upon property taxes as appears in 
the Swedish treaty. However, clause XVI of the Danish treaty 
provides that citizens of either of the contracting nations 
(including persons, partnerships, corporations, associations, 
etc.) while resident in the other contracting nation shall not 
"be subjected therein to other or more burdensome taxes 
than are the citizens of such other contracting State residing 
in its territory. As used in this paragraph ... 'taxes' means 
taxes of every kind or description whether national, Federal, 
state, provincial or municipal." This clause obviously ex-
presses an intent to prevent a state, such as California, or a 
city or a county, such as the defendants herein, from levying 
a discriminatory tax against Danish nationals. It can be 
argued that the apportioned property tax which defendants 
seek to impose upon these airplanes is the same tax which 
they impose upon all citizens (i.e., domestic air lines) of Cali-
fornia or the United States. The fact remains, however, that 
such tax is a ~'more burdensome" tax than imposed upon 
domestic lines because the latter do not also pay ad valorem 
property taxes in Denmark. 
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Those Norwegian treaties mentioned above do not make 
specific reference to personal property taxes, but they do 
. contain language which may be relied on for an argument 
that the federal government intended to relieve the Norwegian 
air lines from taxes such as are at issue here. The treaty deal-
ing with income taxes provides that income which enterprises 
of either nation shall derive from the operation of ships or 
aircraft shall be exempt from taxation in the other contracting 
nation. The treaty concerning taxes on estates and inherit-
ances, in providing for the taxable situs of movable property 
in general, makes a specific exception of ships, aircraft and 
shares thereof by providing that their taxable situs shall be 
the place of registration or documentation. 
In addition to the formal treaties alluded to above, there 
are also in existence a series of executive agreements with 
each of the three countries referred to as "Air Naviga-
tion Agreements," "Air Transportation Agreements," "Air 
Worthiness Agreements," "Pilot License Agreements," etc. 
The various "Air Transportation Agreements" (Denmark--
58 Stat. 1458, E.A.S. No. 430, amended 60 Stat. 1646, T.I.A.S. 
No. 1519; Norway-59 Stat. 1658, E.A.S. No. 482; Sweden-
58 Stat. 1466, E.A.S. No. 431, amended 60 Stat. 1859, T.I.A.S. 
No. 1550) contain articles designed to "prevent discrimina-
tory practices, and to assure equality of treatment," specifi-
cally prohibiting unequal charges for airport facilities, exemp-
tion from custom duties, etc., but none mentions taxation as 
such. On the one hand this fact tends to sustain an argument 
that the contracting parties did not intend to include taxation 
within the possible discriminatory practices which they sought 
to eliminate. On the other hand, it may be argued with equal 
force that since there had never been a tax of this type im-
posed on the dates of the respective treaties and agreements, 
the parties did not have the question of local taxes in mind, 
and would have included them as a prohibited method of dis-
crimination had they existed. Certainly, it is within reason 
to infer that the foreign negotiators, unfamiliar with our dual 
federal-state system, may have assumed that once they had 
eliminated all possibility that the federal government would 
levy a double or multiple tax, there was nothing left to fear 
except the possibility of unfair discriminatory practices by 
airports and other nongovernmental agencies. 
In our opinion, the languag-e of the various treaties and 
agreements clearly eliminates the possibility of local property 
) 
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taxation only insofar as concerns those airplanes owned and 
registered in Sweden. As to that portion of the tax, the judg-
mentof the trial court must be affirmed on this point alone. 
As to the remaining two-thirds of the airplanes, there re-
mains considerable doubt as to the effect of the federal com-
mitments, with only a possibility that the contracting states 
intended to prevent any taxation of any nature (local or 
otherwise) which would afford the domestic air lines of one 
country any advantage over those of the other country where 
such domestic and foreign lines may be in competition. The 
instant tax would discriminate in favor of any United States 
line competing with these Scandinavian lines in commerce 
between the respective nations. But the mere possibility 
that the signatory powers may have so intended is not suffi-
cient ground on which to invalidate that portion of the tax 
imposed upon the planes registered in Norway and Denmark. 
Because we cannot spell out such an intent in the treaties 
with those nations, we cannot invalidate the tax upon the 
ground that it is repugnant to the terms of those treaties. 
However, we have already determined that the tax is repug-
nant to the treaty with Sweden, and must be deemed invalid 
as to the airplanes based and registered in that country. Does 
this mean that defendants are prohibited from taxing Swedish 
airplanes, and yet free to tax planes operating in a similar 
manner, but owned and based in other foreign countries f 
We think not. Such a situation would immediately create 
discrimination between foreign commerce based in a treaty 
country and similar commerce based in other nations. Such 
discrimination would constitute interference with the free 
flow of commerce. As said in Northwestern etc. Cement Co. 
v. Miwnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 [79 S.0t. 357, 3 L.Ed.2d 421, 
67 A.L.R.2d 1292], and in Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 
256 [67 S.Ot. 274, 91 L.Ed. 265], the commerce clause denies 
to the states" one single-tax-worth of direct interference with 
the free flow of commerce." It is obvious that no individual 
state has power to discriminate betwecn foreign nations. 
[24] The principles of state sovereignty apply to internal 
matters, only. No state of this union is sovereign in the eyes 
of a foreign nation. A state cannot deal directly with a 
foreign nation, by treaty or otherwise. This it must leave 
to the federal government. If its attempted actions in a given 
field would result in discriminatory practices as between two 
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foreign nations, then it must eschew that field in its entirety. 
This is but another way of saying, as we said above, that 
taxation of foreign owned and based instruments of commerce 
. represents a field that is peculiarly federal in nature, without 
regard to such specific constitutional considerations as the 
. commerce clause or the due process clause, and which must 
bc left t~ the admmistration of the federal government, even 
in the absence of any present federal legislation thereon. 
[23b] For the reasons set forth, we are of the opinion 
that the terms of the treaty with Sweden prevent the several 
states from imposing any type of property tax upon airplanes 
owned, based and registered in any foreign country, unless 
the overall operations of the owner bring such airplanes 
within the area of property to be taxed, as such is defined in 
that treaty. 
Additional issues urged by the parties: 
The foregoing considerations are determinative of the mat-
ter. We expressly refrain from any decision upon plaintiff's 
contention that neither the California Constitution nor any 
statutory provision provides a basis for the instant tax. The 
balance of the arguments have been answered above, or have 
become moot by reason of the grounds upon which we base 
our decision. 
It is significant that we have been cited to no instance 
wherein any state or political subdivision has ever attempted 
to levy a property tax upon an instrumentality of foreign 
commerce which was both owned and based in a foreign coun-
try. And this is true even though each of our major seaports 
is visited regularly by passenger liners and freighters, operat-
ing on regular schedules, in the same manner in which plain-
tiff's airplanes visit Los Angeles International Airport. All 
of the eases cited above dealt with vessels, airplanes, and 
other instrumentalities owned or based in this country. The 
entire lack of any case dealing with any instrumentality 
owned or based elsewhere indicates that no state has ever 
attempted to tax foreign instrumentalities of commerce arriv-
ing within its jurisdiction solely in foreign trade. If, during 
the 185 years of existence of the United States such property 
has been assumed to be nontaxable, it makes little difference 
whether this belief stemmed from constitutional prohibitions 
or from considerations of policy. If such assnmption were 
now to be overruled, we would open the doors to state taxa-
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tion of every ocean vessel which, for 185 years, has been be-
lieved to be nontaxable. The repercussions would be world-
wide. Retaliatory taxation would be inevitable. The states 
could not cope with such a situation. The only escape from 
such a result would be by holding that airplanes mi~ht be 
taxed under circumstances wherein a ship may 110t. No logical 
basis for such a distinction has been advanred. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Schauer, J., McComb, J., and White, J., concurred. 
DOOLING, J.-I concur in the judgnH'ut and with the 
conclusion that the existing decisions of thc Supreme Court 
of the United States on the "home-port" doctrine as it relates 
to the right to tax vessels engaged in foreign commerce are 
binding upon this court. This phase of the "home-port" 
doctrine has ncver been modified or overruled and, if the 
doctrine is to be reexamincd, the nation's highest judi.::ial 
tribunal which announced it is the only court which can 
effectively make such reexamination. Unless that court sees 
fit to do so, and this case might afford a handy vehicle if its 
Justices are so minded, I feel bound to follow the existing 
law in this field as declared by its earlier decisions. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. 
Neither the due process clause nor the commerce clause 
nor the tonnage clause of the United States Constitution 
precludes state taxation on an apportioned basis of aircraft 
flown in interstate commerce. (Bl"o;n'iff A.i,·ways v. N ebmska 
State Board of Equalization, 347 U.S. 590, 600 [74 S.Ct. 957, 
98 L.Erl. 967]; see also Flying Tigcr Lim', l1!c. v. County 
of Los A.ngcles, 51 Ca1.2d 314, 318 f333 P.2d 323].) They 
do not preclurle equivalent taxation of aircraft owned by for-
eign domiciIiaries flown in foreign commerce. 
"So far as due process is concerned the only question is 
whether the tax in practical operation has relation to op-
portunities, benefits, or protection conferred or afforrlerl h~' 
the taxing State. [Citation.] Those requirements are satisfkrl 
if the tax is fairly apportioned to the commerre carried on 
within the State." (Ott v. 1I1ississip]Ji eir. Bm'gc Line, supra, 
336 U.S. ]69, 174; Braniff Airways v. Nebmska State Board of 
Equalizatio1l, s1tpro, 347 IT.S. 590, 600.) Since plaintiff's rela-
tionship to California is no rlifferent from that of airlines 
) 
44 SCANDINAVIAN AIRLINES SYSTEM, INC. tJ. [56 C.2d 
COUNTY OF Los ANGELES 
engaged solely in interstate commerce, and since the •• oppor-
tunities, benefits, or protection conferred or afforded" are not 
affected by the locations of plaintiff's out-of-state termini, the 
due process clause does not preclude the taxation of its aircraft. 
Nor does the commerce clause or the tonnage clause! exempt 
the instrumentalities of foreign commerce from state ad va-
lorem property taxes. (Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 
114 U.S. 196, 206 [5 S.Ct. 826, 29 L.Ed. 158] ; Old Dominion 
Steamship Co. v. Virginia, 198 U.S. 299, 305-306 [25 S.Ct. 
686, 49 L.Ed. 1059] ; P"Um,an's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsyl-
vania, 141 U.S. 18, 22-23 [11 S.Ct. 876, 35 L.Ed. 613] ; see 
also Wheeling etc. Transportation Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U.S. 
273,279-280 [25 L.Ed. 412].) Once their situs is determined, 
a state may apply its own tax rate and collection procedures. 
It is idle here to discuss the pros and cons of national uni-
formity. It could be achieved only if the states were declared 
powerless to tax instrumentalities or" foreign commerce at 
all or were empowered to tax them only pursuant to federal 
, legislation. 
The issue is whether there is discrimination against foreign 
commerce. Obviously there is no discrimination if a state 
taxes migratory property used in such commerce in the same 
way it taxes migratory property used in interstate commerce. 
Moreover, it precludes discrimination against interstate com-
merce. Plaintiff nevertheless contends that since the United 
States Supreme Court cannot compel foreign countries to 
apportion their taxes by taking into account the absences 
from home of their domiciliaries' migratory property, taxa-
tion here even on an apportioned basis may lead to discrimina-
tory cumulative burdens on foreign commerce. This argument 
erroneously attributes to such taxation the risk of discrimina-
tion. Actually it is attributable to the freedom of foreign 
countries, not permitted to our own states, to adopt rules 
of their own that can result in multiple burdens. The court 
cannot prevent foreign countries from taxing instrumentalities 
of foreign commerce owned by their domiciliaries even if 
those instrumentalities are permanently located here, just as 
it cannot prevent foreign countries from taxing American 
aircraft temporarily abroad even though they have been taxed 
at full value at the domicile of their owners here. It is with-
out power to compel independt'nt nations to adopt a uniform 
'''No State alla1l, without the consent of the Congress, lay any Duty 
of Tonnage .••• " (U.s. Con8t., art. I, § 10, el. 3.) 
') 
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nondiscriminatory system of taxation. It does not follow that 
th~ states must forego the power to impose taxes that are not 
in themselves discriminatory. It bears noting that Congress 
remains free to prohibit altogether state taxation of instru-
mentalities of foreign commerce. Alternatively, treaties could 
govern such taxation to preclude the risk of discrimination. 
Plaintiff also contends that for purposes of ad valorem 
taxation, aircraft flying in foreign commerce are logically 
indistinguishable from ships sailing the high seas and hence 
taxable only at the domicile of their owners. When the home-
port rule was formulated for the taxation of ships in inter-
state as well as foreign commerce, there had yet to be de-
veloped the concept of taxation on an apportioned basis. 
(See Ott v. Mississippi etc. Barge Line, 336 U.S. 169, 173 
[69 S.Ct. 432, 93 L.Ed. 585] ; Aycr ff Lord Co. v. Kentucky, 
202 U.S. 409, 421 [26 S.Ct. 679, 50 L.Ed. 1082]; Southern 
Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63, 69 [32 S.Ct. 13, 56 
L.Ed. 96]; St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 11 Wall. (U.S.) 
423, 431-432 [20 L.Ed. 192]; Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall. 
(U.S.) 471, 478 . [21 L.Ed. 303]; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. 
Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196. 206 [5 S.Ct. 826, 29 L.Ed. 158] ; 
Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 17 How. (U.S.) 596,597-
599 [15 L.Ed. 254]; Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. Vir-
ginia, 198 U.S. 299, 305 [25 S.Ct. 686. 49 L.Ed. 1059].) 
The rule was abandoned in favor of apportioned taxes as 
to vessels plying inland waters in Otf v. Mississippi etc. Barge 
Line, 336 U.S. 169 [69 S.Ct. 432, 93 L.Ed. 585]. (See also 
Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382, 384 [72 S.Ct. 309, 
96 L.Ed. 427, 26 A.L.R.2d 1371].) In leaving open the ques-
tion of ocean carriage, the court in no way suggested that 
the taxation of either ocean carriage or inland carriage would 
depend upon whether it was interstate or foreign commerce. 
Thereafter, in Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Board 
of Equalization, 347 U.S. 590 [74 S.Ct. 757, 98 L.Ed. 967], 
when the analogy between the high seas bordering the nation 
and the airspace above the nation was urged against appor-
tioned taxation of aircraft, the court nevertheless held that 
aircraft flying in interstate commerce could be taxed on an 
apportioned basis. This court adopted the same rule with re-
spect to aircraft flying in foreign commerce in Flying Tiger 
Line, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 51 Ca1.2d 314 [333 P.2d 
323]. (See also Slick Airways v. County of Los Angeles, 
140 Cal.App.2d 311, 315 [295 P.2d 46].) 
I 
I 
I 
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In the Flying Tiger case all members of the conrt agreed 
. that aircraft flying in foreign commerce could not be taxed 
at full value at the domicile of the owner in California if 
they also had attained a taxable situs elsewhere. In contrast, 
the majority in the present case invoke the home-port doctrine 
for the conclusion that aircraft regularly flying into Cali-
fornia from the foreign domiciles of their owners attain no 
taxable situs here and that taxation on an apportioned basis 
is therefore unconstitutional. Rationally, however, the home-
port doctrine should apply to all aircraft regularly flying 
in foreign commerce or to none. If the home-port doctrine is 
applicable to all aircraft regularly flying in foreign commerce, 
the Flying Tiger case must be overruled. 
The Braniff case broke away from the home-port doctrine 
wben it upbeld an apportioned tax on aircraft :flown in inter-
state commerce. There is no more reason to invoke the doctrine 
for aircraft regularly flying in foreign commerce and bear-
ing an identical relationsbip to tbe nondomiciliary state into 
wbich they fly. If as plaintiff contends, aircraft cannot logi-
cally be distinguished from ships, it is the home-port doctrine, 
not the Braniff decision, that must give way. 
Plaintiff contends, further, that the treaties between the 
United States and tbe Scandinavian countries with respect to 
double taxation preclude ad valorem property taxation of 
its aircraft in California. (See Convention and protocol be-
tween the United States of America and Sweden respecting 
double taxation, dated March 23, 1939, ratified August 2, 
1939, proclaimed December 12, 1939, and effective January 
1,1940,54 Stat. 1759, T.S. No. 958, 199 L.N.T.S. 17; Conven-
tion between the United States of America and Denmark 
respecting double taxation, dated May 6, 1948, and effective 
December 1, 1948, 62 Stat. 1730, T.I.A.S. No. 1854; Conven-
tion between the United States of America and the Kingdom 
of Norway for the avoidance of double taxation, dated June 
13, 1949, 2 U.S.T. [1951] pt. 2, p. 2323, T.I.A.S. No. 2357; 
2 U.S.T. [1951] pt. 2, p. 2353, T.I.A.S. No. 2358.) It notes 
that each treaty provides that income from the operation of 
aircraft shall be taxed only in the home country of sucb air-
craft (Treaty with Denmark, art. V; Treaty with Norway, 
art. V; Treaty with Sweden, art. IV). It contends that this 
policy of reciprocity on taxation of income connotes a like 
reciprocity as to local property taxation. There is no merit 
in plaintiff's contention. The draftsmen of the treaties were 
) 
) 
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familiar with both national and local taxation of property as 
well as of income (Treaty with Sweden, art I; Treaty with 
Denmark, arts. I, XVI; Treaty with Norway, art. I), and 
they carefully specified the taxes to which the treaties applied 
and the limitations on the taxing powers of the respective 
nations. Under these circumstances it is not reasonable to 
infer that restrictions on income taxation connoted restrictions 
on property taxation; such an inference would require read-
ing provisions into the treaties that were knowingly omitted. 
It is contended, however, that article XIII of the Swedish 
treaty makes the rule governing income taxation applicable 
to the property taxes imposed on the Swedish-owned aircraft 
in this case. Article XIII provides; 
"In the case of taxes on property or increment of property 
the following provisions shall be applicable: 
"(1) If the property consists of: (a) Immovable property 
and accessories appertaining thereto; (b) Commercial or in-
dustrial enterprises, including maritime shipping and air 
transport undertakings; the tax may be levied only in that 
contracting State which is entitled under the preceding 
Articles to tax the income from such property. 
"(2) In the case of all other forms of property, the tax 
may be levied only in that contracting State where the tax-
payer has his residence or, in the case of a corporation or 
other entity, in the contracting State where the corporation 
or other entity has been created or organized. 
"The same principles shall apply to the United States capi-
tal stock tax with respect to corporations of Sweden having 
capital or other properly in the United States of America." 
Article XIII must be read together with article I, which 
provides: 
., The taxes referred to in this Convention are: 
"(a) In the case of the United States of America: (1) The 
Federal income taxes, including surtaxes and excess-profit 
taxes. (2) The Federal capital stock tax. 
"(b) In the case of Sweden: (1) The National income and 
property tax, including surtax. (2) The National special 
property tax. (3) The communal income tax. 
"It is mutually agreed that the present Convention shall 
also apply to any other or additional taxes imposed by either 
contracting State, subsequent to the date of signature of this 
Convention, upon substantially the same bases as the taxes 
enumerated herein. . . ." 
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Article I thus excludes local property taxation in the United 
States from the ambit of the treaty and makes clear, as the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee stated in urging ratifica-
tion of the treaty, that "the United States makes no agree-
ment respecting any of our State or local taxes." (Report of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Com., Exec. Rep. No. 18, 76th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 1939; see also Bittker and Ebb, Taxation of 
Foreign Income [1960], p. 512.) Had it been the intention 
to include such taxes, they would have been specifically men-
tioned as were the Swedish national property taxes and 
communal income tax. A matter so vital as restrictions on 
the taxing power of the states and their subdivisions would 
hardly have been left to implication from the provisions of 
article XIII, which are directly referable to Swedish property 
taxes and the United States capital stock tax. 
An interpretation of article XIII as applicable only to the 
taxes defined in article I does not render the general language 
of article XIII governing property taxation meaningless inso-
far as the United States is concerned, for that language states 
the principles that shall also apply to the United States 
capital stock tax or "any other or additional taxes imposed 
by [the United States] ... subsequent to the date of signa-
ture of this Convention, upon substantially the same 
bases. . . ." (Art. I.) Such an interpretation gives effect to 
both articles and avoids conflict between them. (See City 0/ 
Long Bcaeh v. Vick6rs, 55 Ca1.2d 153, 162 [10 Cal.Rptr. 
359, 358 P.2d 687) ; Hough v. McOarthy, 54 Cal.2d 273, 279 
[353 P.2d 276].) 
Finally, plaintiff contends that the Legislature has not 
provided for the taxation of aircraft on an apportioned basis. 
Section 404 of the Revenue and Taxation Code provides that 
"All taxable property, except State assessed property, shall 
be assessed by the assessing agency of the taxing agency 
where the property is situated." (See also Rev. & Tax Code, 
§§ 201,405.) The word "situated" in this section refers not 
to mere physical presence on tax day, but to the situs of 
property within the state necessary to give jurisdiction to 
tax. (Brock & Co. v. Board 0/ Supervisors, 8 Ca1.2d 286, 
289-290 [65 P.2d 791, 110 A.L.R. 700].) Since a properly 
apportioned part of migratory property regularly used in 
interstate or foreign commerce in the state has such a situs, 
the Legislature has provided for its assessment and taxation. 
(See Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. County 0/ Los Angeles, 51 
